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Chapter 7 
Population Growth, Famine and 
Economic Growth 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine briefly some aspects of the 
demography of my field area. This discussion will lead into the focus of 
the next chapter, which aims to examine the organisation of production 
and labour, paying particular attention to the relationship between labour 
demand and household size and structure. 
The concern with demography is relevant to this study for at least two 
reasons. On a priori grounds it would seem that susceptibility to famine 
is likely to increase with increased population. I have already discussed 
the high rate of population increase in Rajasthan generally, so this 
question needs to be considered. It is, however, interesting that, as the 
population of Rajasthan has increased since the last century, the drastic 
human consequences of famine have been less evident, so it may be that 
the a priori assumption is incorrect. It was just this sort of contradiction 
that stimulated an impressive study by Maclachlan (1983). In studying 
the organisation of agriculture in a south Indian village called Yaavahalli, 
he was struck by the fact that a drought related famine in 1877-78 caused 
very high mortality, whereas a very serious (although less serious) 
drought in 1965 caused much less suffering and no deaths directly related 
to famine in Yaavahalli itself. The puzzling thing was that the population 
in 1965 was much higher than in 1877-78. I will return to Maclachlan's 
argument in the next chapter. For the present the main point is that the a 
priori assumption that increasing population increases susceptibility to 
famine is not as certain as it appears. 
A second reason for including consideration of demography is the 
connection between population growth and the apparent decline in the 
quality of natural resources, through desertification, in western Rajasthan. 
To the extent that there is an environmental crisis then the increased use 
of marginal land and overgrazing to meet the needs of increasing 
population are relevant. 
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Village Census Methodology 
The most recent information on village population for Hinganiya 
comes from a village census of Hinganiya which I carried out in 
December 1985 and January 1986. The census was carried out as a series 
of semi-structured interviews, using a check list of questions. Information 
on population was compiled in the form of genealogical charts covering 
all residents of Hinganiya. I interviewed at least one member of each 
household (not necessarily the household head), or a member of a closely 
related household, in order to obtain data on population by sex and by age 
category. I use the term 'age category' because the actual age of children 
and youths in years was often simply unknown. I was forced to classify 
people in fairly broad categories based on 'social age' rather than on 
chronological age. The definitions used are as follows: 
'Adult' - A person is counted as an adult when he or she fulfills either one of the 
following criteria: 
- Married or previously married. For the purposes of this definition a child-
marriage is not regarded as a marriage until the mukhlawa (the final 
ceremony before co-habitation) has taken place. 
- Known to be (or thought by informants to be) over seventeen years 
old. 
'Child' - A person is counted as a child if he or she has not completed all 
stages of the marriage process and is under seventeen years old. 
'Full-time Resident' - A person is treated as a full-time resident when he 
or she is normally resident in the village. 
'Part-time resident' - A person is treated as a part-time resident if he (the 
category, in practice, only includes males) is a member of a household 
resident in the village, but normally spends a substantial amount of 
time living and working elsewhere (in Jodhpur, in the Army, at school 
etc.). 
Where a man owns land or property in the village, and perhaps visits 
occasionally, but is normally resident elsewhere with wife and children, 
he is not included in my census. I refer to such people as 'absentees'. 
The census was taken over a rather lengthy period and is not intended 
to represent actual residence on a particular day. Rather, it represents de 
jure residents, those people who would normally be resident, wherever 
they might have been at the end of January 1986. (Although the census 
was collected over a period of approximately two months, it was 
amended as changes occurred in order to represent the situation at the end 
of January.) Middle-term visitors (such as married daughters returning to 
·spend a few weeks or months with parents) are, thus, not included. On the 
other hand, married women normally resident in Hinganiya but absent at 
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the time of my census visiting their parents or kin in their village of 
origin, are included. 
The Growth of Village Populations 
In Chapter 2, I discussed the general trend of a high rate of increasing 
population for Rajasthan in general and for western Rajasthan in 
particular. Within this general trend there were severe fluctuations 
connected with major famines. The same general pattern is evident in 
village level census figures, from 1891 to 1981. 
The populations of the four villages from 1891 to 1981 are set out in 
Table 7 .1. (I have, unfortunately been unable to obtain village 
populations for 1951.1) An overall increase from 1891 to 1981 occurred 
in all four villages. In fact the overall increases are about threefold, 
ranging from two and a half times to four times increases for the various 
villages. This is consistent with a statement by Malhotra and Saha (1985) 
that population in the Thar Desert increased threefold between 1901 and 
1981. 
Table 7.1 
Village populations according to censuses 1891-1981 
-
Village 
Hinganiya Kur Knokhariya Kukunda 
1891 163 405 158 370 
1901 98 315 124 304 
1911 49 402 105 280 
1921 67 282 73 245 
1931 102 422 114 281 
1941 140 534 189 397 
1961 196 674 334 697 
1971 229 1014 490 768 
1981 409 1312 653 1084 
Note: Population figures are based on decennial censuses of Marwar State 
(1891-1941) and of India (1961-81). Figures from 1891 to 1931 were 
extracted from· a retrospective summary in Census of Marwar, 1931; figures 
from 1941 are from Census of Marwar, 1941 and subsequent figures are from 
Census oflndia 196lb, 1971 and 198la. 
1 I have been unable to locate the relevant volumes in any of the collections I have 
searched. I suspect village level data was not published at all for the ex-Princely 
States in the turmoil of transition which was occurring in the early 1950s. 
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In addition to the general trends the fluctuations in population are 
interesting. In each village there were decreases from 1891 to 1901, 
coinciding with a general decrease of 23.4% for Marwar in the same 
period and with the serious famines in the second half of the decade. Yet 
between 1901 and 1911 one village (Kur) experienced an increase, while 
the others experienced decreases. This occurred in the context of a 
general increase of population for Marwar of 6.3%. Further, from 1911 to 
1921 Hinganiya experienced an increase, the other three experiencing 
decreases in the context of an overall 10.5% decrease for Marwar in the 
same period. (Trends for Marwar from 1891-1901, 1901-1911 and 1911-
1921 have been calculated from figures in the Census of Marwar 193lb.) 
The occurrence of decreases in population is usually related to death or 
migration due to drought. But, why is it that a decrease occurred in some 
villages, while an increase occurred elsewhere in the same period? The 
point of mentioning this is to emphasise that general demographic 
changes occur in the context of significant local variations. For example, 
the anomalous increase in Hinganiya from 1911 to 1921 is probably 
related to the arrival of the ancestors of the present Soda Rajput 
inhabitants, who are reported to have settled about sixty years ago. Other 
factors, such as the failure of a well, may lead to a crisis situation when 
everything is normal elsewhere. 
The decreases in population, either at a village level or at the level of 
Marwar State (or, now, Jodhpur District) do not necessarily indicate high 
mortality, although the major sequence of famines from 1896 to 1900 
caused high mortality in western Rajasthan (Kachhawaha 1985). During 
that famine the brothers of the ancestor of all the Meghwals in Hinganiya 
left due to the drought and went to live in Mewar (now Udaipur District), 
leaving a single household of Meghwals in the village. That this sort of 
permanent crisis migration was fairly common among the other castes is 
evident in the 70% reduction in Hinganiya's population from 1891 to 
1911. It was only in the 1930s and 1940s that the populations of the four 
villages recovered to the 1891 levels. From this point population seems to 
h~ve expanded rapidly, despite the occurrence of famines. 
The huge increase in Hinganiya from 1971 to 1981 is highly suspect. 
The decadal percentage increase for 1971-1981 was 78.6%, whereas 
comparison of the 1981 figure with my 1986 figure (433) represents a 
five year increase of 5.87%. Obviously a natural increase of 79% in ten 
years is impossible, and there is no local account of major immigration 
during that period. I have no explanation for the discrepancy, although I 
assume that it must relate to an error in the 1971 census, as the 1981 
census is fairly consistent with my 1986 findings. 
The major pattern here is that this century has been characterised by a 
huge overall increase, despite setbacks due to famine in the first decades 
of the century. Interestingly, it is at about the time of the incorporation of 
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the State of Marwar into modem India that the population increase 
becomes con,sistent. It is possible that it may have been the 
implementation of land reform, combined with improved economic 
conditions under the Indian Republic, that took the brakes off population 
control. I will return to this point later in this chapter. 
The other important point arising from these figures is the importance 
of migration in adjusting population. The role of shorter term migrants is 
highlighted in a breakdown of village population, which specifically 
identifies part-time residents. The details are in Table 7.2. Just under 26% 
of all adult males are part-time residents, including nearly half the Nayak 
men and nearly a third of Rajputs. This pattern, in which village 
populations include a number of people (almost always males) who have 
an ambiguous residential status, is a common one in western Rajasthan. I 
have described these people as part-time residents, although they could 
also be described as having dual residence.2 I will examine this form of 
migration further in Chapter 9 and show how it is connected with 
drought. 
Discussion 
I have very briefly outlined some of the demographic characteristics of 
my field area, with particular reference to Hinganiya. In terms of overall 
population trends the main point is the occurrence of an apparent 
acceleration of growth rate some time after the 1941 Census. Essentially 
this amounts to stabilisation of the death rate, which had previously 
fluctuated widely due to famines. This brings us to a debate about the 
relationship between economic development and population growth. 
D'Souza discusses the common assumption in demography 'that there 
is a negative correlation between economic development and population 
growth' (1986:77). In other words as an economy develops the rate of 
population growth declines. According to D'Souza's summary, the 
argument works in four stages: 
• Prior to economic development a country has high birth and death 
rates resulting in a net slow rate of population growth. 
• Sustained economic growth brings down the death rate leading to a 
faster rate of population growth, as the birth rate remains static. 
• Population pressure leads to a fall in the birth rate, 'narrowing the 
gap between birth and death rates' (p.77). 
• The birth and death rates again establish a balance, but this time at 
a lower level. 
2 Rosin ( 1968) deals with what I call part-time residents in tenns of a differentiation 




Population of Hinganiya January 1986 by caste* 
Full-Time Part-Time 
Caste Adult Child Adult Child Overall 
M F M F Total Male Male Total Total 
Rajput 28 39 36 39 142 11 2 13 155 
Bishnoi 33 35 29 39 136 5 1 6 142 
Jat 1 1 3 2 7 0 0 0 7 
Meghwal 5 5 7 6 23 2 0 2 25 
Nayak 11 24 36 24 95 9 0 9 104 
Total 78 104 111 110 403 27 3 30 433 
* = excluding absentes 
This assumed process has, according to D'Souza, often been explained 
in terms of an economic decision making model which treats children as 
'durable consumer goods for their parents' (p. 78). In other words, people 
in underdeveloped economies have large numbers of children because 
they provide labour and support to parents in their old age. With 
economic development, according to the economic decision making 
model, the value of children to their parents becomes less. On this model, 
rural western Rajasthan would be on the second step. 
D'Souza claims that the economic decision-making model which is 
alleged to explain 'the negative relationship between economic 
development and population growth has not been systematically tested' 
(p. 78). He presents his own study of three villages in the Indian Punjab 
as evidence that there is no necessary relationship between economic 
development and population growth. He concludes that, in fact, economic 
development sometimes actually encourages the development oflarge 
families, by providing alternative economic opportunities. His own 
analytical model is 
that parents, rather than regarding children as consumer 
durables, are anxious about the career prospects of their children. If 
the parents try to restrict the size of their families it is not so much 
because they do not derive much economic benefits (sic) from their 
children but because thereby they hope to improve the career 
prospects of their children. (D'Souza 1986: 92-3) 
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The point I wish to emphasise is that the relationship between 
economic prosperity and family size is arguable. Economic prosperity is 
usually seen as being a stimulus for smaller families, but it can be seen as 
a stimulus for larger ones, at least in some circumstances. 
In order to see whether there is any relationship between economic 
prosperity and family size in Hinganiya, I have attempted to make a 
comparison of numbers of children in different landholding groups. I 
adopted the strategy of looking at the surviving offspring of wives of 
present household heads (and women who are themselves household 
heads), because I wished to exclude very young married women and to 
get a figure as close as possible to the fertility of women who have had all 
or most of the children they are likely to have. Focusing on wives of 
household heads is a way of focusing on mature women. Recently 
married women are not likely to show much about lifelong fertility. For 
this reason it seemed useful to minimise the distortion caused by life-
cycle factors by excluding the wives of junior members of joint 
households. This does not entirely solve the problem because nuclear 
family households, with relatively young women as wives of household 
heads do exist. Nevertheless, focusing on wives of household heads 
reduces the distortion. 
In order to examine the relationship between fertility and 
landholdings, I have ranked all households into the landownership 
categories developed in Chapter 5. Taking the average number of 
surviving offspring of the wives of household heads for each of these 
landholding categories, there is a tendency for those with more land to 
have more children (see Table 7.3). 
Although the differences between any one category and another are 
not statistically significant,3 the overall pattern of trends for the five 
categories remains suggestive. There were no landholding categories 
which fell outside the overall pattern of average numbers of living 
offspring increasing with landholding size. Assuming that the pattern 
may be significant, analysis of fertility patterns (the basis of population 
growth) in Hinganiya lends some support to D'Souza's claim of a direct 
positive relationship between prosperity and the development of large 
families. However, the analysis of the implications of differences in 
prosperity in Hinganiya really is dealing with small differences within a 
generally economically depressed population. Any direct relationship 
may well be a result of the greater health disadvantages of the poor rather 
than of increased economic opportunities of the less poor. In a situation 
where the general mortality rate has fallen without compensatory declines 
3 A test was carried out using the Scheffe procedure (a very conservative test), 





Number of surviving offspring of wives of household head 
or female household head by landholding size category 
Category Average living 
(land- ha) offspring Range 
5 (>20) 5.75 2-10 
4 (10-<20) 4.87* 1-10 
3 (5- <10) 4.8 1-7 
2 (2-<5) 3.47 0-6 
1 (<2) 3.53 0-7 
Nil 2.6 1-5 
* - One household head has two wives and one of these is not normally 
resident. If she is counted (no offspring) the average for category 2 becomes 
4.59. 
in the birth rate, the mortality rates (particularly child mortality rates) of 
the poorer people may have dropped less.4 Rather than prosperity leading 
to increased fertility, we may have a case of greater poverty contributing 
to higher mortality. In other words, it is not so much a case of wealthy 
people having more children, but of the children of poor families 
surviving less often. 
A further theme of debate is the relationship between population 
growth and labour requirements or labour inputs: does population 
increase because of increased need for labour, or do labour inputs 
increase because population has increased? 
Boserup (1965) argued that the intensification of agriculture is a 
response to population increase. Geertz (1963), arguing along similar 
lines, concluded that the population increase in Java in the early 
nineteenth century resulted in a massive degree of intensification of 
agriculture. These writers treat agricultural labour as a dependent variable 
and population as the independent variable in the relationship between 
population and agricultural intensification. The population changes, so 
agricultural inputs, including labour, increase. Increasing population in 
Java was frequently seen as being the result of improved economic 
conditions under Dutch colonialism. 
4 Unfortunately, it is impossible to compare meaningfully the crude birth and death 
rates (number of births or deaths per thousand per year) for separate castes or 
landholding categories, because the populations are so small. Further, in the case 
of crucial factors such as infant mortality, it is impossible to obtain reliable data, 
largely because people are reluctant to talk about them. 
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Other writers have disagreed with the view that population growth is 
the independent variable. Bronson (1972), for example, argues that 
population increase occurs in response to increased labour demand. This 
labour demand model has been suggested as an alternative explanation of 
what happened in Java. White (1973) argues that increased labour 
demands resulting from the Dutch system of forced production led to 
increased population. Thus, population becomes the dependent variable. 
Alexander, in a review of the debate in respect of Java, argues that the 
historical evidence for a vast increase in labour demands in the nineteenth 
century is far stronger than the evidence that population increased as a 
result of the benign effects of Dutch rule. He argues that Geertz's (1973) 
... claim that Dutch labour demands could be met by rearranging 
work patterns is based on a substantial underestimate of the extent 
of labour expropriation by the Dutch. (Alexander 1984:364) 
The possibility of increasing population in Rajasthan being a result of 
the large demands of the jagirdars is enticing. Unfortunately for this 
argument, the sudden surge in population growth in Rajasthan occurred in 
the 1940s to 1960s, at a time when the jagirdari system was breaking 
down. Land reform in the 1950s, in fact, saw the end of the system. 
This suggests an alternative possibility: perhaps it was the labour 
demands of newly acquired land that led to the change. Again, I think this 
is unlikely, at least as far as the villages in my field area are concerned. 
The area under cultivation in Hinganiya changed little after land reform. 
In Chapter 5, I concluded that land reform, in Hinganiya, mostly changed 
the status of the people who were farming land, rather than transferring 
use rights on a large scale. If this is correct, then people were essentially 
farming what they farmed before and, possible reduced fallow periods 
aside, demands on labour would probably not have increased 
significantly. On the contrary, freed of the need to give a substantial 
proportion of production to landlords, the new landholders would have 
had far more to feed themselves with, without any increase in work, had 
the population remained constant. 
The relationship between land reform and population growth has not 
been explored in detail. Jodha suggests that the introduction of land 
reform was one of the factors which 'unleashed the forces of population 
growth' (1985:258), but he does not explore the mechanism behind the 
relationship. From the context in which his statement is made, the 
implicit argum~nt is that the results of land reform became part of a 
general improvement in economic conditions, which lead to population 
increase. 
In the light of this sort of argument, I am forced to return to a fairly 
conventional view of population growth. As economic growth, connected 
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with incorporation into India (at first merely in terms of incorporation 
into the economy of British India and later into the Indian state) occurred 
in the 1940s to 1960s, mortality rates decreased without a comparative 
reduction in birthrates. An important factor in declining mortality was 
probably the increased capacity of the state to deal with drought and 
famine. 
Labour demand is rejected as an explanation for population growth in 
this chapter. However, this does not mean that increased labour demand, 
or increased labour inputs, could not have developed as a consequence of, 
or a response to, population growth. This possibility will be explored in 
the next chapter. 
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